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McElwee v. County of Orange
United States Court of A ppeals
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2012
(Argued: October 4, 2012 Decided: November 15, 2012)
Docket No. 11-4366-cv
James C. McEl w ee,
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v.
County of Ora ng e,
Defendant-Appellee.
Ra g g i, Ch i n, and Ca r n e y, Circuit Judges. 
Appeal from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York 
(Duffy, J.), entered on September 30, 2011, dismissing
plaintiff’s claims under Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. , and Section 
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seq., following the district court’s grant of defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Stephen Bergstein, Bergstein & Ullrich, 
LLP, Chester, New York, for 
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Karen Folster Lesperance (David L.
Posner, on the brief), McCabe & Mack 
LLP, Poughkeepsie, New York, for 
Defendant-Appellee.
Brian D. East, Disability Rights 
Texas, Austin, Texas, for Amici 
Curiae National Disability Rights 
Network and Autism Speaks.
Ch i n, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff James C. McElwee appeals from a judgment 
of the United states District Court for the southern 
District of New York (Duffy, J. ) . McElwee served as a 
volunteer at Valley View Center for Nursing Care and 
Rehabilitation ("Valley View”), a federally funded entity 
operated by defendant Orange County (the "County"). In 
2009, McElwee was dismissed from Valley View’s volunteer 
program after engaging in erratic and harassing behavior 
toward female staff members. McElwee, who was previously 
diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder, brought
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this action against the County pursuant to Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 (the "Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et 
seq., alleging that he was denied a reasonable 
accommodation for his disability.
The district court found that McElwee was not 
disabled within the meaning of the statutes and granted the 
County's motion for summary judgment dismissing the 
Complaint. We affirm the district court’s award of summary 
judgment, albeit on different grounds.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed, unless 
otherwise noted.
A. The Plaintiff
McElwee is a man in his mid-thirties with a 
neurodevelopmental disorder formally classified as 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder - Not Otherwise Specified 
("PDD-NOS") and informally called an autism spectrum 
disorder. He has an IQ of 79, placing him in the eighth 
percentile of intellectual functioning. He lives with his
- 3 -
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mother, has never held a job, and likely will always 
require assistance in managing money and completing non­
routine tasks.
In 1996, McElwee began participating in a 
volunteer program at Valley View, where he performed 
j anitorial and housekeeping duties and transported nursing 
home residents to religious and social events. McElwee 
competently performed these assigned tasks without 
hindrance from his alleged disability. Meanwhile, the 
volunteer program improved his self-esteem by allowing him 
to associate with other people in the community and provide 
a service to the elderly and infirm.
B. A Staff Member Complains
On November 20, 2009, Martha Thompson, a staff
member at Valley View, informed Robin Darwin, the Assistant 
Administrator, that McElwee was "acting inappropriately 
towards her and making her feel uncomfortable." 
Specifically, Thompson complained that on multiple 
occasions, McElwee had waited for her and followed her in 
the hallways, staring at her rear end. Thompson also told 
Darwin that she was aware of at least two other women at
- 4 -
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Valley View who McElwee had "bothered" or made to feel 
uncomfortable.
On November 24, 2009, Darwin and Amy Fey, the
Director of Activities, met with McElwee to inform him that 
someone had complained about his behavior and to discuss 
the allegations with him. When Darwin asked McElwee if he 
knew who the complainant might be, McElwee replied that it 
might be a social worker named Lindsay because he "look[s] 
at her and talk[s] to her." When Darwin told McElwee that 
it was not Lindsay, he guessed that it might be a 
particular nurse's aide, admitting, "I talk to her too, and 
look at her." McElwee then said that God was trying to 
punish him because of his "history, " and he explained that 
when he was in high school he "made a mean phone call to a 
girl, saying nasty/dirty things." McElwee further stated, 
"there needs to be punishment and now, " and made a gesture 
simulating slitting his throat. When Darwin asked him what 
he meant, McElwee replied that he "deserve[d] to be 
punished when [he does] bad things." McElwee then made an 
angry face and said, "just when I think someone is going to 
pat me on the back someone stabs me, " simultaneously making
- 5 -
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a gesture as if he were holding a knife and repeatedly 
stabbing himself in the back. When Darwin informed McElwee 
that it was Thompson who had complained about him, he said: 
"Oh, I should have known. I had a feeling she was going to 
turn me in."
C. Valley View Investigates Further
After her meeting with McElwee, Darwin spoke with 
Valley View’s Facility Administrator, who told her to 
conduct a further investigation regarding McElwee’s 
behavior if she was considering terminating his volunteer 
services.
On November 25, 2009, Darwin informed McElwee that
she was disturbed by the situation, she was going to 
conduct an investigation, and he should leave Valley View 
and not return until he heard from her. McElwee started to 
cry, and said that Darwin was a conduit of God. He said 
that God was telling him not to do these things anymore, 
and was punishing him for what he had done in the past. 
McElwee also said that he had been conducting research at 
the library over the last several months to see if his
- 6-
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behavior could be considered domestic violence or sexual 
harassment.
Darwin subsequently conducted an investigation by 
interviewing individuals at Valley View about McElwee’s 
behavior. In total, five women reported that McElwee had 
behaved inappropriately toward them, and a security guard 
reported that he had seen McElwee bothering nursing 
students and visitors.
Liz Murphy, a staff member in Valley View’s 
payroll department, told Darwin that McElwee watched her 
and followed her on her breaks, and she recounted one 
instance when McElwee sat in the lobby and watched her 
while she distributed checks. Murphy told Darwin that this 
behavior had been going on for a few years but had 
increased since the previous spring. She said she gave 
McElwee the cold shoulder and went out of her way to avoid 
him. Barbara Decker, another payroll department employee, 
told Darwin that McElwee used to carry around a stuffed 
dolphin that he asked women to pet, in a manner she 
perceived as sexually suggestive. Decker also said that 
several years earlier McElwee had inquired about dating her
- 7 -
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daughter, and that the way he spoke about her daughter made 
her uncomfortable. Pat Matero, the Director of Admissions, 
told Darwin that McElwee once asked her how he would look 
in a Speedo, and that she had observed him in the past 
"playing up” to young aides with sexual innuendo. Irene 
Simpson, the Activities Supervisor at Valley View, told 
Darwin that McElwee once said to her, "[d]o you realize 
what I could do to you?" in what she felt was a threatening 
way. Eric Gould, a security guard at Valley View, told 
Darwin that Thompson and Murphy had complained to him that 
McElwee’s behavior made them feel uncomfortable. Gould 
also said he had observed McElwee leering at and acting 
inappropriately around female nursing students and 
visitors .
D. McElwee is Dismissed
Based on her investigation, Darwin concluded that 
McElwee was a potential liability for Valley View in that 
he was sexually harassing staff, nursing students, and
- 8-
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visitors, and had exhibited disturbing behavior when 
confronted with these allegations.1
On November 30, 2009, McElwee’s mother called
Darwin and told her that McElwee "is not like everyone 
else” and that he should not be discriminated against 
because he has a disability and because he was looking at 
people. She asked Darwin to call McElwee’s therapist, who 
could better explain why he acted the way that he did. 
Darwin never called the therapist.
Darwin consulted with Valley View’s Facility 
Administrator, the County Executive’s Office, and the 
County Law Department regarding the results of her 
investigation. On December 1, 2009, she sent McElwee a
letter, stating that his volunteer services were no longer 
needed at Valley View.
On December 10, 2009, McElwee went to Valley View
to sing Christmas carols for the residents. When he
McElwee argues that some of the identified incidents 
occurred many years earlier, it was not his intention to harass 
or make people feel uncomfortable, and his actions must be 
viewed in the context of his disability; he does not dispute, 
however, that the incidents occurred or that they were reported 
to Darwin as described.
- 9-
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arrived at the facility, a security guard told him he was 
not allowed inside the building because of "what had 
happened recently."
E . Procedural History
McElwee filed the action below on January 8, 2010,
alleging that the County had violated the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act by dismissing him from the volunteer 
program and subsequently excluding him from Valley View 
altogether without providing him a reasonable accommodation 
for his mental impairment.
Following discovery, the County moved for summary 
judgment. On September 29, 2011, the district court
granted the County’s motion, holding that McElwee was not 
"’substantially limited’ in the major life activity of 
interacting with others" and therefore was not " disabled" 
under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. See McElwee v. 
Cnty. of Orange, No. 10 Civ. 00138 (KTD), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 114663, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011). In
particular, the court held, "while Plaintiff may suffer 
from a diagnosed disorder, . . . Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that his mental impairment substantially
- 10 -
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impairs his ability ’to connect with others, i.e., to 
initiate contact with other people and respond to them, or 
to go among other people —  at the most basic level of 
these activities.'" Id. at *16 (quoting Jacques v.
DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2004)).
The court did not consider whether McElwee was 
otherwise qualified to be a volunteer at Valley View or 
whether the accommodations he sought were reasonable. 





1. Standard of Review
We review an award of summary judgment de novo, 
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in 
his favor. McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583
F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009) . Summary judgment is
appropriate where the record reveals that there is "no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
- 11 -
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). A factual dispute is genuine "if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may affirm summary judgment on
any ground supported by the record, even if it is not one 
on which the district court relied. 10 Ellicott Sq. Ct. 
Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d
Cir. 2010).
2. The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied 
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits programs and activities 
receiving federal financial assistance from excluding, 
denying benefits to, or discriminating against "otherwise 
qualified" disabled individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a) . 
Because the standards adopted by the two statutes are
- 12 -
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nearly identical, we consider the merits of these claims 
together. See Abrahams v. MTA Long Island Bus, 644 F.3d
110, 115 n.3 (2d Cir. 2011) .
To assert a claim under Title II of the ADA or 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that (1) he is a qualified individual with a 
disability; (2) the defendant is subject to one of the 
Acts; and ( 3) he was denied the opportunity to participate 
in or benefit from the defendant's services, programs, or 
activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the 
defendant because of his disability. Henrietta D. v. 
Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).
A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an 
individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, 
the removal of architectural, communication, or 
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids 
and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements 
for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12131. A "disability” is defined as ”a physical
- 13 -
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or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities.” Id. § 12102(1)(A).
Under both statutes, a defendant discriminates 
when it fails to make a reasonable accommodation that would 
permit a qualified disabled individual "to have access to 
and take a meaningful part in public services."2 Powell v. 
Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2004);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (the term 
"discriminate" under the ADA includes "not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
Although McElwee brought the instant case pursuant to 
Title II of the ADA, we may look for guidance to case law under 
Title I of the ADA, which governs employment discrimination, 
because (i) courts use the terms "reasonable modifications" in 
Title II and "reasonable accommodations" in Title I 
interchangeably, see, e.g., Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 
364 F.3d 79, 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing "accommodations"
provided in Title II case); Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. 
Sheriff's Dep't, 500 F.3d 1185, 1195 n.8 (10th Cir. 2007)
(noting that "Title II's use of the term 'reasonable 
modifications' is essentially equivalent to Title I's use of the 
term ’reasonable accommodation’"); and (ii) McElwee’s volunteer 
position at Valley View was analogous to that of an employee, 
see, e.g., Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass'n, Inc., 427 F.3d 
1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that reference to Title I 
case law was appropriate in Title III case where plaintiffs, who 
were volunteers, "act[ed] in a capacity at least somewhat 
analogously to that of an employee").
- 14 -
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disability who is an applicant or employee”). ”A 
’reasonable accommodation’ is one that gives the otherwise 
qualified plaintiff with disabilities ’meaningful access’ 
to the program or services sought.” Henrietta D. , 331 F.3d
at 282 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301
(1985)).
Although a public entity must make "reasonable 
accommodations, ” it does not have to provide a disabled 
individual with every accommodation he requests or the 
accommodation of his choice. See Fink v. N.Y.C. Dep't of 
Personnel, 53 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1995) . An
accommodation is not reasonable if it would impose an undue 
hardship on a program’s operation or "would fundamentally 
alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 
Powell, 364 F.3d at 88 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.53,
35.130(b)(7)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, under the ADA, workplace misconduct is a 
legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating 
employment, even when such misconduct is related to a
- 15 -
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disability. A requested accommodation that simply excuses 
past misconduct is unreasonable as a matter of law.3 4
Although it is generally "the responsibility of 
the individual with a disability to inform the employer 
that an accommodation is needed," Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Graves v.
Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 2006))
3 See Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 172 
(2d Cir. 2006) (the ADA does not "require that employers 
countenance dangerous misconduct, even if that misconduct is the 
result of a disability"); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,
540 U.S. 44, 54 n.6 (2003) (rejecting suggestion that employer’s 
refusal to rehire someone because of his disability-related 
misconduct would violate the ADA); Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. 
Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir. 2012) (”[M]isconduct 
-- even misconduct related to a disability -- is not itself a 
disability and may be a basis for dismissal.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).
4 See Canales-Jacobs v. N.Y.S. Office of Ct. Admin., 640
F. Supp. 2d 482, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The ADA does not excuse 
workplace misconduct because the misconduct is related to a 
disability.”); Fahey v. City of N.Y., No. 10 Civ. 4609 (ILG) 
(MDG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15104, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,
2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim where 
requested accommodation was to receive penalty other than 
termination for past misconduct); Whalley v. Reliance Grp. 
Holdings, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4018 (VM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
427, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2001) (holding that plaintiff’s
belated request for accommodation after learning of employer’s 
decision to terminate him amounted to a request for a second 
chance); U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement 
Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, question 36 (2002) ("Since 
reasonable accommodation is always prospective, an employer is 
not required to excuse past misconduct even if it is the result 
of the individual’s disability.").
- 16 -
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(internal quotation marks omitted), under certain 
circumstances, an employer is required to act proactively 
and engage in an interactive process to accommodate the 
disability of an employee even if the employee does not 
request accommodation, see id.; see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o) (3) ("To determine the appropriate reasonable 
accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to 
initiate an informal, interactive process with the 
individual with a disability in need of the 
accommodation."). Nevertheless, an employee may not 
recover based on his employer's failure to engage in an 
interactive process if he cannot show that a reasonable 
accommodation existed at the time of his dismissal. See 
McBride, 583 F.3d at 99-101.
A plaintiff alleging that he was denied a 
reasonable accommodation bears the burdens of both 
production and persuasion as to the existence of some 
accommodation that would allow him to meet the essential 
eligibility requirements of the service, program, or 
activity at issue. See id. at 97. Once the plaintiff has 
demonstrated that there is a "plausible accommodation, the
- 17 -
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costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its 
benefits,” the defendant bears the burden of proving that 
the requested accommodation is not reasonable. Borkowski 
v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir.
1995) .
B. Application
In this case, the parties agree that McElwee has 
satisfied the second element of his claim: Valley View is
a federally funded entity of the County, and therefore is 
subject to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 
U.S.C. § 12131(1) (B) (defining "public entity” as, inter 
alia, "any department, agency, special purpose district, or 
other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government”); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting 
discrimination by "any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance”) .
The parties dispute, however, whether the first 
and third elements are satisfied, i.e., whether McElwee is 
a qualified individual with a disability and whether the 
County discriminated against him by denying him a
- 18 -
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reasonable accommodation. We discuss these elements in 
turn .
1. Whether McElwee is a Qualified Individual with a 
Disability
The question whether McElwee is a qualified 
individual with a disability has two aspects, namely, 
whether he is disabled and whether he is qualified. We 
consider both aspects below.
a. Whether McElwee is Disabled 
The district court found that McElwee was not 
substantially limited in the major life activity of 
interacting with others and concluded that McElwee was not 
disabled. See McElwee, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114663, at
*20. On appeal, McElwee argues that the district court 
erred by failing to consider the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
("ADAAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008),
which amended the ADA to provide that the definition of 
"disability" shall be construed broadly "to the maximum 
extent permitted by the terms of this chapter" and "[t]he 
term ’substantially limits’ shall be interpreted 
consistently with the findings and purposes of the
- 19 -
Case: 11-4366 Document: 91-1 Page: 20 11/15/2012 768882 29
[ADAAA]." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A), (B).5 Similarly, the
amici curiae argue that, in light of the ADAAA, the 
district court erred in concluding that McElwee is not 
disabled.
Both McElwee and amici raise fair concerns as to 
whether the district court erred in not addressing whether 
McElwee was substantially limited in the major life 
activities of working, caring for himself, communicating, 
thinking, and brain function. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) 
(providing that "major life activities include, but are not 
limited to" caring for oneself, learning, concentrating, 
thinking, communicating, working, and the operation of 
major bodily functions such as brain function); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j) (1) (i) (instructing courts to construe the term 
"substantially limits" broadly); id. § 1630.2(j) (3) (iii)
( specifically identifying autism as an impairment that 
substantially limits brain function in virtually all 
cases). Nonetheless, we need not decide whether the
5 The ADAAA became effective on January 1, 2009 and 
applies to claims, such as McElwee’s, that arose after that 
date. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008).
- 20 -
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district court erred in finding McElwee was not disabled 
because even assuming arguendo that a reasonable jury could 
find McElwee disabled, the County is entitled to summary 
j udgment for the reasons set forth below.
b. Whether McElwee is Qualified
Although the parties disputed before the district 
court whether McElwee is a qualified individual, the court 
did not address this issue. See McElwee, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 114663, at *1, *12.
McElwee asserts that he is qualified to 
participate in Valley View's volunteer program because he 
adequately performed his volunteer duties for years. The 
County, on the other hand, argues that McElwee’s 
"longstanding course of inappropriate conduct with numerous 
female employees, nursing students, and visitors to the 
facility” disqualified him from serving as a volunteer.
As noted, an individual is qualified to 
participate in a program if he meets the essential 
eligibility requirements for participation in the program, 
with or without reasonable accommodations. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131(2) . To determine whether an individual is
- 21 -
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qualified, courts look to a program’s "formal legal 
eligibility requirements." Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 277
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132). An eligibility 
requirement is not considered "essential" if a "reasonable 
accommodation would enable an individual to qualify for the 
benefit." Castellano v. City of N.Y., 946 F. Supp. 249,
253 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 142 F.3d 58
(2d Cir. 1998).
The "benefit" here at issue is the ability to 
participate in Valley View’s volunteer program. To be 
qualified for such participation, a person must have been 
not only mentally and physically able to perform the tasks 
assigned to him, but also emotionally able to conduct 
himself in an appropriate manner when dealing with 
residents, supervisors, and other staff members. There is 
no dispute that McElwee was always qualified to perform the 
former functions. But by at least 2009, his sexual 
harassment of female staff members appears to have rendered 
him unqualified as to the latter. See, e.g., Higgins v.
Md. Dep't of Agric., No. L-11-0081, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25303, at *18 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2012) (finding plaintiff’s
- 22 -
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inappropriate workplace behavior rendered him unqualified 
because ” [t]he ’essential functions’ of [plaintiff’s] 
position included courteous and professional interactions 
with the public, fellow staff, subordinates, and 
supervisors”).
The extent to which McElwee’s aberrant behavior, 
which he attributed to his disability, disqualified him 
from participating in Valley View’s volunteer program is 
perhaps more easily addressed by asking whether a 
reasonable accommodation for his disability existed. See 
Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am. Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir.
2006) (concluding that plaintiff’s misconduct is "distinct 
. . . from the issue of minimal qualification to perform a
job” (quoting Owens v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 934 F.2d 405,
409 (2d Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We address that issue below.
2. Whether the County Discriminated Against McElwee
McElwee alleges that his dismissal from Valley 
View’s volunteer program was unlawful discrimination 
because he was not provided a reasonable accommodation for 
his disability. In particular, he claims that Darwin
- 23 -
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should have (1) worked with him and his therapist to help 
him behave more appropriately in the workplace; and (2) 
worked with the Valley View employees who complained about 
him to educate them about McElwee’s disability so that they 
would be more tolerant of his behavior.
As an initial matter, McElwee’s claim is as much a 
request to excuse his past misconduct as it is a request 
for future accommodation. He does not dispute that he 
followed and stared at female employees or that his conduct 
was reasonably perceived by others as inappropriate. It is 
also undisputed that when Darwin asked him about this 
behavior, he engaged in perseveration and made disturbing 
statements and gestures. This inappropriate behavior is 
indisputably a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 
dismissing McElwee from the volunteer program, even if the 
behavior resulted from his disability. See Canales-Jacobs 
v. N.Y.S. Office of Ct. Admin., 640 F. Supp. 2d 482, 500
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue 
Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
question 36 (2002). "The ADA mandates reasonable
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accommodation of people with disabilities in order to put 
them on an even playing field with the non-disabled; it 
does not authorize a preference for disabled people 
generally.” Felix v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102,
107 (2d Cir. 2003).
Further, even if, as McElwee argues, Darwin should 
have known he was disabled and proactively engaged in an 
interactive process to assess whether his disability could 
be reasonably accommodated, see Brady, 531 F.3d at 135-36,
he has not met his burden of showing that the proposed 
accommodations are plausible, see McBride, 583 F.3d at 99­
101; Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138. On the contrary, as
discussed below, both of the accommodations McElwee now 
claims he was denied are unreasonable on their face, as a 
matter of law.
The first accommodation McElwee proposes is that 
Valley View should have spoken to his therapist or 
"encourage[d] him to obtain particularized therapy to help 
him behave more appropriately in the workplace and . . .
better interact with colleagues." Nothing in the record 
before us, however, indicates that further therapy would
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have helped McElwee to refrain from his inappropriate 
conduct, either immediately or at any time in the near 
future.6 On the contrary, a psychological evaluation 
conducted in August 2009 -- three months before McElwee was 
dismissed from Valley View -- indicated that he had a long­
standing pattern of repeatedly approaching girls and women 
and obsessing about their rejection of him, and that this 
behavior was consistent with his PDD-NOS diagnosis. The 
evaluation also suggested that his perseverative behavior 
and inability to take constructive criticism were 
characteristics of his impairment.
Further, McElwee’s psychiatrist of 14 years wrote 
a letter to McElwee’s counsel in January 2011 -- a year 
after McElwee filed the Complaint in this case -- reporting 
that ” [Mr. McElwee] does not respond to social cues (and 
body language) such as when people are having a private
6 See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d
92, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that a plaintiff requesting a 
reassignment as an accommodation must demonstrate that a vacant 
position existed "at or around the time when accommodation was 
sought”); see also Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 
1995) ("[R]easonable accommodation is by its terms most 
logically construed as that which presently, or in the immediate 
future, enables the employee to perform the essential functions 
of the job in question.").
-2 6-
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conversation, when the topic is inappropriate to the 
situation, when it is time to change the subject, when he 
is making someone uncomfortable.” The psychiatrist did not 
suggest that further therapy would enable McElwee to behave 
appropriately. Accordingly, McElwee’s proposed 
accommodation for Valley View to work with him to obtain 
additional therapy was unreasonable as a matter of law 
because he has failed to offer any assurance that it would 
have enabled him to meet the essential eligibility 
requirements of Valley View’s volunteer program at any time 
in the near future.7
See, e.g., Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 
F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding requested accommodation 
unreasonable because plaintiff "could offer no assurance the 
requested accommodations would remedy her many job performance 
deficiencies," especially where a letter from her doctor warned 
that plaintiff "has a lifelong illness that ’will likely 
fluctuate considerably’"); K.H. ex rel. K.C. v. Vincent Smith 
Sch., No. 06-CV-319 (ERK) (JO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22412, at
*24 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006) (finding requested accommodation
unreasonable because it likely would not "make it possible for 
[plaintiff] to continue to attend the School and benefit from 
its educational program"); Higgins v. Md. Dep't of Agric., No. 
L-11-0081, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25303, at * 21 (D. Md. Feb. 28,
2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim 
because plaintiff "has not identified an accommodation that 
would have enabled him to conform his behavior to an acceptable 
standard").
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McElwee’s second requested accommodation -- for 
Valley View to work with the women who complained about his 
behavior "to educate [them] about plaintiff’s disability or 
to [help them] better understand the nature of [their]
concerns about plaintiff" is also unreasonable as a
matter of law. This proposed accommodation does not even 
purport to address McElwee’s inappropriate behavior; 
instead, it simply demands that others be more tolerant. 
Requiring others to tolerate misconduct, however, is not 
the kind of accommodation contemplated by the ADA.8
Further, nursing home employees, volunteers, and visitors
8 See Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 
208, 217 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that Title I and the associated
regulations define "reasonable accommodation" as including but 
not limited to job restructuring, modified work schedules, 
reassignment, and adjustments to work environment) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)); 42 
U.S.C. § 12131(2) (accommodations available in Title II case 
include "modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the 
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation 
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services"); 
see, e.g., K.H., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22412, at *23 (finding 
request for plaintiff’s psychiatrist to meet with school 
officials "to talk things over" and psychiatrist’s statement 
that officials "needed to have more patience and more tolerance" 
with plaintiff, without recommending a particular plan to manage 
plaintiff’s behavior, was not a reasonable accommodation); Hall 
v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2005)
(holding that plaintiff’s "sought-after accommodation -­
tolerance of his dishonesty -- . . . materially differs in kind
from the more common accommodations previously recognized by 
this court").
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should not be required to tolerate harassing behavior, and 
it would be an undue hardship for Valley View to have to 
countenance behavior of this kind.9
In sum, McElwee failed to present sufficient 
evidence below to raise a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether he was discriminated against because of his 
disability.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the 
district court is affirmed.
See, e.g., Darcangelo v. Verizon M d I n c . ,  No. WDQ- 
02-816, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37660, at *11 (D. Md. June 7,
2005) ("Requiring [plaintiff's] coworkers and supervisors to 
suffer her tirades and harassment . . . constitutes an undue
hardship which [her employer] cannot be expected to bear.”), 
aff'd, 189 F. App’x 217, 218-19 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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